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SAFEGUARDS AGAINST SUGGESTIVENESS: A
MEANS FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF HYPNO-
INDUCED TESTIMONY
The primary inquiry in determining the admissibility of testimony
obtained by hypnosis is whether hypnosis is a means of acquiring scienti-
fically reliable evidence.' In Frye v. United States,2 the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals stated that evidence relating to a scientific
principle or discovery is admissible when the principle is established suf-
ficiently to have gained general acceptance in a particular field.' When
ruling on the admissibility of hypno-induced testimony, courts apply the
Frye standard for assessing reliability.4
The medical profession's recognition of the value of hypnosis as a
technique for retrieving lost memory 5 has convinced some jurisdictions
' See Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (W.D. Va. 1976) (potential
unreliability is reason for exclusion of hypnotic evidence); Rodriguez v. State, 327 So.2d 903,
904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (court unconvinced of reliability of statements induced by hypnosis),
cert. denied, 336 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1976); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1327 (Okla. Crim. App.
1975) (hypnotic tests excluded for failure to achieve sufficient scientific and psychological ac-
curacy).
2 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3 Id. at 1014. In applying the Frye test for admission of scientific evidence, the Frye
court excluded expert testimony explaining the systolic blood test. Id. Courts frequently
cite the Frye case when dealing with the admissibility of scientific evidence. See R.
LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 934 (1977); note 4 infra (citing
cases). But see State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980). The Hall court held that the
"general scientific acceptance" standard was not a prerequisite to the admission of scientific
evidence if the reliability of the evidence is established by independent means. The court
applied the standard of whether the probativeness, materiality, and reliability of the
evidence outweighed the possible prejudice. Id. at 85-86.
4 Cf. State v. Mack, - Minn. - , - , 292 N.W.2d 764, 767-69 (1980) (testimony
from hypnotically-induced memory does not satisfy Frye requirement of scientific accuracy);
State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 361, 441 A.2d 291, 305 (1980) (hypnosis fails Frye test of
reliability as technique for obtaining factually accurate memory).
5 L. WOLBERG, HYPNOANALYSIS 308 (1964). The three most common hypnotic tech-
niques for stimulating memory of forgotten events are age regression, hypermnesia and
post-hypnotic suggestion. During complete age regression, the subject actually relives the
past. In partial age regression, the subject experiences a past incident but is able to under-
stand events from an adult viewpoint. In hypermnesia the subject remembers rather than
relives the forgotten event. Post-hypnotic suggestion occurs when the subject awakens
from a trance with a restored memory because the hypnotist has suggested during the
trance that memory of the forgotten event will return. See D. CHEEK & L. LECRON,
CLINICAL HYPNOTHERAPY 47-54 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CHEEK & LECRON]; Spector &
Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38
OHIO ST. L. REV. 567, 572-74 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Spector & Foster, Admissibility].
Hypnosis can provide valuable information into the state of mind of the accused and assist
in the accurate determination of criminal intent. W. BRYAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS 33
(1962)
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that hypno-induced testimony warrants automatic admission.' In juris-
dictions which automatically admit hypno-induced testimony, the effect
of hypnosis on the reliability of evidence bears only upon the weight or
credibility given the testimony by the trier of fact.' A per se rule of ad-
missibility circumvents the necessity of introducing expert testimony
for the purpose of establishing the validity of hypnosis as an analytical
tool.' Nevertheless, expert testimony may be helpful to the trier of fact
in determining the credibility of the witness' testimony by revealing the
presence of suggestive influences in the hypnotic session. The use of
hypnosis should be disclosed both to enable the opposing party to im-
peach the credibility of the witness and to provide the jury with ade-
quate information to make an informed determination of credibility.'
In most jurisdictions, however, the admissibility of testimony ob-
tained by hypnosis is within the discretion of the trial judge, who weighs
the probative value of the evidence against the danger of prejudice."0
Judicial reluctance to establish a per se rule of admissibility reflects a
concern that the jury will accord undue significance to the weight of
possibly unreliable hypno-induced testimony.11 The scientific community
acknowledges the possibility that suggestiveness during hypnosis could
' E.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.) (pre-trial hypnosis to
refresh recollection of witness' recollection is admissible), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979);
Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509 (9th Cir. 1974) (civil case permitting
testimony of witness whose memory had been refreshed by hypnosis); United States v. Nar-
ciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 282 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (resolution of expert disagreement over sug-
gestiveness of hypnotic-induced identification is jury function); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or.
App. 1, 9, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971) (witness' inconsistent stories prior to and following hyp-
nosis do not affect admissibility but influence jury determination of credibility).
See note 6, supra.
United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1979).
United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 830-32 (2d Cir. 1969).
10 See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 732-33, 382 P.2d 33, 39, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225,
231-32 (1963) (error for court to fail to exercise discretion in considering exclusion of
evidence of tape recordings of statements made while witness hypnotized); Harding v.
State, 5 Md. App. 230, 236, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (admissibility of testimony obtained through
hypnosis rests within discretion of trial judge), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1968). See
generally, Annot., Admissibility of Hypnotic Evidence at Criminal Trial, 92 A.L.R.3d 442, §
2a (1979) [hereinafter cited as Annot.]. The exercise of discretion involves balancing the pro-
bative value of the testimony against the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury. FED. R. EvID. 403.
" See State v. LaMountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 551, 611 P.2d 551, 555, (1980) (en banc) (error
to admit witness' in-court testimony because record did not reveal possible effect of
previous hypnotic identification upon subsequent testimony); Merrifield v. State, - Ind.
- - 400 N.E.2d 146, 150, (1980) (independent basis for in-court identification
rendered testimony of previously hypnotized witness reliable); State v. Mack, - Minn.
- - 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (1980) (inquiry into reliability of witness' testimony to
determine probative value); State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 338-359, 414 A.2d 291,
294-303 (1980) (scrutinizing entire hypnotic procedure to determine whether testimony suf-
ficiently reliable to warrant admission); State v. White, No. J-3665 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee Cty.
1979) (standard for admissibility based upon reliability under totality of circumstances).
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produce an historically inaccurate memory. 2 As a result, the judiciary
realizes the impact which the circumstances surrounding the hypnotic
session can have upon the reliability of hypno-induced testimony. 3
Courts are justifiably unwilling to leave the determination of reliability
of hypno-induced testimony to a jury that may be unaware of the impor-
tant considerations in making such a determination. Thus, courts
generally review the particular hypnotic procedure used in- each case to
assess the effect of hypnosis upon reliability before making a decision on
admissibility. 4 A case-by-case analysis of the admissibility issue coupled
with the establishment of procedural safeguards against unreliability
enables the trail court to detect and protect against conditions conducive
to rendering the memory inaccurate. Analysis based on the facts of each
case is the best means for ensuring that the trier of fact hears only ade-
quately reliable hypno-induced testimony.
An understanding of the nature and effects of hypnosis is essential
to an examination of the accuracy of hypnotically-refreshed memory.' 5
The American Medical Association (AMA) defines hypnosis as a condi-
tion of altered attention in which the subject manifests alterations in
consciousness and memory, increased susceptibility to suggestion, and
the production of responses and ideas unfamiliar to those occurring in
the usual state of mind." Because of the general lack of knowledge about
hypnosis as a scientific phenomenon, 7 a definition of hypnosis must focus
upon a description of the observable effects of hypnosis upon the sub-
ject's mental state.'8
According to the widely-recognized theory of heightened sug-
gestibility during hypnosis, a person in a trance is more willing to adopt
" See State v. Mack, - Minn. , -, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (1980) (experts
testified that therapeutic value of hypnosis does not rely upon production of historically ac-
curate memory). The Minnesota court noted that the medical community had conducted lit-
tle investigation into the accuracy of the memory induced by hypnosis. Id.; see Spector &
Foster, Utility of Hypto-Induced Statements in the Trial Process, 10 Loy. CHI. L.J. 691, 695
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Spector & Foster, Utility] (hypnosis useful tool for retrieving
memory of suppressed events, regardless of factual accuracy of memory).
,1 See State v. LaMountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 551, 611 P.2d 551, 555 (1980) (testimony ex-
cluded due to uncertainty of whether suggestiveness in pre-trial hypnotic procedure produced
testimony); State v. Mack, - Minn. -, -, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (1980) (subject's
susceptibility to suggestion during hypnosis affected reliability of testimony); State v. Hurd,
173 N.J. Super. 333, 362, 414 A.2d 291, 305 (1980) (potential for fabrication during hypnosis
militates against automatic admissibility until reliability of hypnotically-induced recall
established); State v. White, No. J-3665 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee Cty. 1979) (court must deter-
mine whether suggestiveness in hypnotic session rendered in-court testimony unreliable).
" See note 13 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 16-33 infra.
" Council on Mental Health, Medical Use of Hypnosis 168 J.A.M.A. 186, 187 (1958).
" Spector & Foster, Admissibility, supra note 5, at 569. Proficiency in the practical ap-
plication of hypnosis far surpasses scientific knowledge of the phenomenon. Id.
18 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
1981]
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an idea or suggestion without argument, command, or coercion.19 One
reason for the hypnotic subject's increased responsiveness to suggestion
is that the hypnotist must convey a sense of emotional security and
absence of threat to ensure the subject's cooperation.' The close in-
terpersonal relationship which emerges during the hypnotic session
creates a desire on the part of the subject to please the hypnotist.21 Thus,
the subject may be willing to conform responses to the expectations of
the hypnotist as perceived by the subject.22 The subject's attempt to
comply with hypnotic suggestions often results in a tendency to fabri-
cate events not actually remembered.' If the hypnotist suggests that
the subject remember what transpired during the hypnotic session, the
subject will recall the forgotten events as related during hypnosis and
be convinced that the memory of those events is accurate.24 Further-
more, experts recognize the difficulty in determining whether all or any
part of a refreshed recollection is truth, falsehood or fantasy.'
The danger that hypno-induced memory may be inaccurate should
not require per se exclusion of testimony of a witness who has under-
gone hypnosis. The factual accuracy of any testimony is not a prere-
11 E. HILGARD, HYPNOTIC SUSCEPTIBILITY 9-10 (1965) [hereinafter cited as HILGARD]; R.
REIFF & M. SCHEERER, MEMORY AND HYPNOTIC AGE REGRESSION 96 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as REIFF & SCHEERER]. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1360 (4th unabr. ed. 1976)
(definition of suggestibility).
I See M. MILLER, THERAPEUTIC HYPNOSIS 42 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MILLER]. An
important characteristic of the hypnotic process is a reduction in the subject's emotional
control and inhibition. As a result, the subject experiences a heightened degree of sensitiv-
ity to emotional stimuli and relief of a repressed emotion by discussion. Id. at 33.
21 CHEEK & LECRON, supra note 5, at 44; REIFF & SCHEERER, supra note 19, at 89. The
failure of a hypnotist to establish the necessary rapport with a subject contributes to a sub-
ject's resistance to hypnotism. CHEEK & LECRON, supra note 5, at 21-22.
Spector & Foster, Utility, supra note 12, at 698.
Id. at 697. The hypnotic subject experiences a tolerance for accepting distortion of
reality as the truth and an arousal of visual imagination which results in a tendency to
substitute the actual memory with fantasy. See HILGARD, supra note 19, at 8-9. A major pro-
blem with the use of hypnosis to obtain factually accurate information is that the subject
may fabricate details in order to avoid issues or to please a listener. This tendency is known
as "confabulation." E. MONAGHAN, HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 86 (1980). The risk
of confabulation is especially great during post-hypnotic suggestion when the hypnotist sug-
gests that the subject will remember clearly the forgotten event when the subject has no ac-
tual memory of the event. Admissibility of Present Recollection Restored by Hypnosis, 15
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 357, 361 (1979). The subject may feel pressured to respond to the hyp-
notic suggestion as a result of desire to please the hypnotist. In addition, the subject tends
to respond literally to hypnotic suggestion. See REIFF & SCHEERER, supra note 19, at 89.
These factors enhance the potential for the hypnotized person to "remember" events that
actually did not occur. See id. at 91.
Spector & Foster, Admissibility, supra note 5, at 592.
See State v. Mack, __ Minn. ., -, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (1980) (determination
whether witness' statements constitute "lies, confabulation, or fantasy" is difficult); State v.
Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 349, 414 A.2d 291, 297 (1980) (danger that hypnotically-induced




quisite for admission into evidence." Moreover, the hypnotist can follow
certain procedural guidelines for the purpose of detecting and elimi-
nating suggestiveness in the hypnotic process.' The trial court should
take steps to ensure that the hypnotist used a procedure conducive to
the restoration of an accurate memory.
One means by which the hypnotist can reduce suggestibility is by
controlling the depth of the trance.' Because the hypnotist's ability to
manipulate the subject increases as the trance deepens, the depth of the
hypnotic trance affects the potential for suggestion to produce an inac-
curate memory.' Moreover, a positive correlation exists between
susceptibility to hypnotism and potential for suggestibility during hyp-
nosis."0 Thus, the individual who is able to attain a deep level of hypnotic
trance experiences a heightened degree of suggestibility. Since, in most
cases, a light trance is adequate for retrieving memory," the hypnotist
can avoid enhancing the subject's susceptibility to suggestion and still
accurately refresh recollection. Personality traits and general social and
educational background appear to influence individual variations in
susceptibility to hypnosis.2 The hypnotist must be careful to protect
against suggestive influences when the subject is highly suggestible.
The relationship between the depth of trance, suggestibility, and the
subject's personal characteristics necessitates an examination of the ef-
fect of the entire hypnotic process upon the reliability of the memory
recall in determining whether hypno-induced testimony is admissible.
33
The method of introducing hypno-induced statements into evidence
has been an important factor in judicial treatment of admissibility."
Spector & Foster, Admissibility, supra note 5, at 584. Hypnosis should be regarded
as a device for aiding the procurement of testimony that offers no guarantees of factual ac-
curacy. Id.
' See text accompanying notes 93-111 infra.
23 CHEEK & LECRON, supra note 5, at 13; REIFF & SCHEERER, supra note 19, at 50-51.
The use of repetitive types of stimulation inhibits intellectual functions which increases sug-
gestibility and intensifies the trance-like state of hypnosis. MILLER, supra note 20, at 36. As
a result, the hypnotist can employ techniques to reduce suggestibility by avoiding stimula-
tion that increases the level of the trance. In addition, the hypnotist can determine the
depth of hypnotic trance by eliciting responses from the subject which indicate the trance
level. REIFF & SCHEERER, supra note 19, at 92.
Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotic Influenced Testimony, 4 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 1,
5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dilloff].
HILGARD, supra note 19, at 32.
3, CHEEK & LECRON, supra note 5, at 20-21.
HILGARD, supra note 19, at 342-43 (although compilation of personality traits which
enhance individual's susceptibility to hypnosis remains elusive, individuals capable of deep
involvement in reading, dramatic arts, esthetics, religion and adventure seem more suscep-
tible to hypnotism); MILLER, supra note 20, at 41 (education, intelligence, culture, religion,
family, and life experience seem to be contributing factors regarding individual's respon-
siveness to suggestion).
' See State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 361-62, 414 A.2d 291, 305 (1980); text accom-
panying notes 19-25 supra.
' Courts do not permit the expert to relate the statements made by the subject while
under hypnosis if offered as proof of the matter asserted. E.g., Rodriquez v. State, 327 So.2d
1981]
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Courts have been most receptive to the admission of in-court testimony
of a witness who has undergone pretrial hypnosis to stimulate recall."
The legal analysis for determining admissibility of hypno-induced
testimony involves an extension of the evidentiary rule that a witness
may use any memorandum or object to induce recollection.," If a witness
uses a writing to refresh memory prior to testifying, the trial court
makes a discretionary assessment of the reliability of the means and the
accuracy of the recall.' In addition, the adverse party is entitled to in-
spect the writing, to cross-examine the witness, and to introduce into
evidence those portions of the writing that relate to the testimony of the
witness." The procedural safeguards assist the trier of fact in evaluating
the credibility of the testimony to determine whether a suggestible wit-
ness may believe that he remembers a fact because he has read it. 9
903, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 336 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1976); State v. Pierce, 263
S.C. 23, 30, 207 S.E.2d 414, 418 (1974); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 716, 204
S.E.2d 414, 419 (1974). Under basic evidentiary rules, the hypnotist's transmission of sub-
ject's statements is inadmissible as hearsay. See FED. R. EvID. 802. Most courts have refused
to admit tape recordings of hypnotic sessions on the ground that hypno-induced statements
are unreliable. E.g. Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456, 457 (5th Cir. 1973); People v. Hiser,
267 Cal. App.2d 47, 61-62, 72 Cal. Rptr. 906, 915-16 (1968); Shockey v. State, 338 So.2d 33, 37
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 345 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1976); State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860,
887-88, 46 N.W.2d 508, 522 (1951); State v. Harris, 241 Or. 224, 237, 405 P.2d 492, 498 (1965).
Courts do not permit a witness to testify in-court while hypnotized. See Greenfield v. Robin-
son, 413 F. Supp. 1113, 1121 (W.D. Va. 1976) (potential unreliability is basis for disallowing
defendant to testify while under hypnosis); Annot., supra note 10, at 454.
' E.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978); United States v. Nar-
ciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 281-82 (E.D. Mich. 1977); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App.3d 379, 387-88,
385 N.E.2d 848, 854-55 (1979); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246-47, 246 A.2d 302, 312
(1968); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 122, 244 S.E.2d 414, 429 (1978); State v. Jorgensen, 8
Or. App. 1, 9, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971).
" FED. R. EVID. 612. Rule 612 states that a witness may use a writing to refresh
memory for the purpose of testifying. Because hypnosis serves as a means of aiding memory
and not as a means of ascertaining the truth, different legal analysis applies for the admissi-
bility of hypno-induced statements than for the admissibility of results from lie detector or
truth serum tests. See People v. Hiser, 267 Cal. App.2d 47, 61-62, 72 Cal. Rptr. 906, 915
(1968) (unreliability of lie detector test results requiring inadmissibility does not require ex-
clusion of hypnotic statements); People v. Harper, 111 Ill. App.2d 204, 209, 250 N.E.2d 5, 7
(1969) (no reason to equate examination under hypnosis to tests using truth serum); Haward
& Ashworth, Some Problems of Evidence Obtained by Hypnosis, August 1980 CRIM. L.R.
469, 474 [hereinafter cited as Haward & Ashworth]. Courts are reluctant to admit results
from lie detector tests. E.g. People v. Seipel, 108 Ill. App.2d 384, 389, 247 N.E.2d 905, 908,
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1057 (1969). Results of truth serum tests are inadmissible because
there is no guarantee that statements resulting from such tests are truthful. State v. White,
60 Wash.2d 551, 568, 374 P.2d 942, 953 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963).
11 FED. R. EVID. 612. Williams v. United States, 365 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 981 (1966); Beaty v. United States, 203 F.2d 652, 655 (4th Cir. 1953); Buckley v.
United States, 33 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1929).
FED. R. EVID. 612.
FED. R. EVID. 612, Advisory Committee's Note; E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EvI-
DENCE, § 9 (2d ed. 1972).
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Judicial application of the memory-refresher rule has expanded the
interpretation of the term "writing" considerably beyond its literal
meaning. The analysis for the admission of any testimony stimulated by
a memory refresher focuses upon whether the "writing" improperly sug-
gested the expected testimony to the witness.41 The primary concern in
admitting hypno-induced testimony is that suggestiveness during the
hypnotic session has rendered the restored recollection inaccurate. 2
Thus, the memory refresher rule provides both an analysis for ad-
missibility of hypno-induced testimony and a means for assessing
credibility.
One standard of admissibility under the memory-refresher rule per-
mits the use of any means to induce recollection as long as the recall
functions independently of the actuating cause of the recollection.43 In
the case of a memorandum, courts may consider the recall to function in-
dependently if the witness need not look at the writing while testifying.44
Courts face a greater problem in ascertaining the independence of the
recall when hypnosis is used to stimulate recollection because the ac-
curacy of the restored memory is difficult to assess.45 Thus, courts can-
not rely upon the witness' sworn testimony that hypnosis has restored
present recollection in deciding the admissibility issue.4" The previously
hypnotized witness is convinced that his refreshed memory is accurate
despite the fact that some of the events remembered actually may not
have occurred. Because the witness subjectively believes the veracity of
the memory, cross-examination loses effectiveness as a means of attack-
ing credibility and the accuracy of the recall.47 Testimony and cross-
4 See Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1975) (memory revived-
by hypnosis similar to restoration by reading document); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96,
119-20, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427-28 (1978) (court equates memory restoration by reading of docu-
ment to intervening psychiatric treatment and intervening hypnosis); Spector & Foster, Ad-
missibility, supra note 5, at 586 (subjecting witness to leading questions equal in validity
and legal effect to use of hypnosis as memory refresher); Note, Refreshing the Memory of a
Witness Through Hypnosis, 5 U.C.L.A.-ALA. L. REV. 266, 268 (1976) (courts are liberal in
permitting refreshing of witness' recollection) [hereinafter cited as Refreshing Memory of
Witness].
" United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883, 889 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941
(1949).
42 See note 11 supra.
's Jewett v. United States. 15 F.2d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 1926) (testimony refreshed by
notes at witness stand inadmissible because recollection cannot function without notes).
4' Id.
'5 See text accompanying notes 19-26 supra.
" See text accompanying note 25 supra. But see, Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230,
236, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (1968) (since witness testified that present recollection was restored,
court found no objection to admissibility of hypno-induced testimony); Comment, Some
Observations on the Law of Evidence-Memory, 41 HARv. L. REV. 860, 861 (1928) (if witness
swears that memory has been restored, court will permit use of anything from photograph
to press clipping for memory refresher).
'" See State v. Mack, - Minn. - - 292 N.W.2d 764, 770 (1980) (because hyp-
notized person subjectively convinced of veracity of memory, recall not susceptible to at-
tack by cross-examination); Spector & Foster, Admissibility, supra note 5, at 593 (cross-
1981]
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examination of the hypnotist may be helpful in acquiring knowledge
about the reliability of the particular hypnotic procedure used." Prior to
admitting the hypnotist's expert testimony and of hypno-induced testi-
mony, all jurisdictions require the hypnotist to establish his qualifica-
tions as an expert in the field of hypnosis.49 As further protection against
unreliability, many courts require independent corroboration of the facts
asserted during hypno-induced testimony and precautionary instruction
to the jury to give such testimony the same weight as any other evi-
dence. 0
In Harding v. State," the Maryland Court of Special Appeals applied
examination virtually ineffective to assure against implementation of -false suggestions dur-
ing hypnotic interview). But see State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 9, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (1975)
(adverse party's cross-examination of witness who has undergone hypnosis overcomes ob-
jections to admissibility of witness' testimony); Refreshing Memory of Witness, supra note
40, at 269 (adversary system provides some protection against abuse because cross-
examination of witness t~sts credibility and accuracy of restored memory).
41 Spector & Foster, Admissibility, supra note 5, at 593. The hypnotist's own asser-
tion, however, that no suggestive influences were present during the hypnotic session
should not be a decisive factor in determining admissibility. See note 103, infra.
" E.g., People v. Busch, 56 Cal.2d 868, 876-77, 366 P.2d 314, 319-20, 16 Cal. Rptr. 898,
903-04 (1961) (testimony of psychiatrist excluded for failure to show qualifications as expert
on hypnosis); People v. Marsh, 170 Cal. App.2d 284, 287, 338 P.2d 495, 497 (1959) (hypnotist
may testify as expert witness upon demonstrating special knowledge, skill, or experience
which enables formulation of opinions which laymen unable to assert); State v. Donovan, 128
Iowa 44, 47-48, 102 N.W. 791, 792 (1905) (superintendent of hospital for insane who had
witnessed hypnotism experiments by others and surgeon who had practiced hypnotism but
had no formal training permitted to testify as experts); State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333,
363, 414 A.2d 291, 306 (1980) (licensed psychiatrist or psychologist trained in use of hypnosis
should conduct hypnotic session). Courts consider the hypnotist's level of expertise to be an
indication that the hypnotist was aware of and, thus, could guard against suggestiveness.
See Spector & Foster, Utility, supra note 12, at 701.
" See, Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (W.D. Va. 1976) (hypno-related
evidence inadmissible because of lack of independent corroboration); Creamer v. State, 232
Ga. 136, 138, 205 S.E.2d 240, 241-42 (1974) (hypnotic session did not taint testimony because
witness' relation of principal facts of crime prior to session constituted independent cor-
roboration); Merrifield v. State, - Ind. - , -, 400 N.E.2d 146, 149 (1980) (victim's
positive identification of defendant on two occasions prior to hypnotic session prevented
taint to in-court identification).
While the precautionary instruction does not enhance the reliability of hypno-induced
testimony, courts often require the instruction to alert the jury to the danger of unreliabil-
ity. Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1974) (cautionary instruction
to jury regarding use of hypnosis appropriate); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 244, 246
A.2d 302, 306, (1968) (trial judge cautioned jury not to place greater weight on hypnotically-
adduced testimony than upon any other testimony); Dilloff, supra note 29, at 21 (recent
cases indicate judicial willingness to admit hypnotic testimony if accompanied by precau-
tionary instruction); Comment, Hypno-Induced Statements: Safeguards for Admissibility,
1970 LAw & SOC. ORDER 99, 119 (precautionary instruction increases admissibility of hypno-
induced statements) [hereinafter cited as Safeguards]. In jurisdictions which investigate
reliability before determining admissibility, the precautionary instruction may not serve an
important function. The instruction has a greater impact where the jury determines the
reliability of the testimony.
11 5 Md..App. 230, 246 A.2d 302, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1968).
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a similar set of safeguards in upholding.the admission of the testimony
of a prosecuting witness who had undergone pretrial hypnosis to restore
recall of the events at the scene of the crime.2 The witness' in-court
recitation of the facts and assertion that the testimony derived from her
own recollection was determinative of the admissibility issue. The
Harding court cited four factors that enhanced the reliability of the
testimony. First, the court noted that the evidence fully revealed the
hypnotic procedure used.5 ' The first factor enabled the court to detect
elements of suggestiveness. Second, the hypnotist was a professional
psychologist who testified to the absence of any reason to doubt the
truthfulness of the witness' statement.55 A third factor was the existence
of sufficient independent corroboration of the victim's testimony. Finally,
the court noted that the trial judge has issued a precautionary instruc-
tion warning the jury not to place undue weight on the testimony. 7 The
court maintained that the witness' prior inconsistent account of the
events affected only the credibility of the testimony.-5 The court in-
dicated, however, that in some cases the absence of some indicia of
reliability may render hypno-induced testimony so unreliable that a jury
should not hear it.5
The major shortcoming of the Harding analysis is the court's
reliance upon the hypnotist's detailed account of the hypnotic interview
to detect the presence of improper suggestion."0 The requirement of a
recording of the hypnotic session would have enabled the court to deter-
- Id. at 247, 246 A.2d at 306. The Harding court's inquiry focused upon whether the
evidence supported the guilty verdict. Id. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence,
the court quoted the testimony of the hypnotist. The court expressed particular concern
over the reliability of information obtained through hypnosis. Id. at 237-44, 246 A.2d at
306-10.
5 Id at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
1 Id. at 247, 246 A.2d at 313. The Harding court apparently meant that the disclosure
of the hypnotic session permitted the court to detect factors affecting the reliability of the
testimony.
Id. Expert witness was chief clinical psychologist at a state hospital who had four
years' experience in the use of hypnosis. Id. at 235-36, 246 A.2d at 306. But see Jones v.
State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1326 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). In Jones, the court did not allow the hyp-
notist to give an opinion concerning the truthfulness of a defendant's statements made
under hypnosis. Id.
Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 247, 246 A.2d 302, 312 (1968).
57 Id.
Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
Id. at 236, 247, 246 A.2d at 306, 312.
Id. at 246, 246 A.2d at 311. The major criticism of the Harding opinion has been the
court's failure to require a more stringent standard for admissibility because of the danger
that suggestiveness rendered the witness' recollection inaccurate. Dilloff, supra note 29, at
19. Because the police solicited the hypnotist's assistance, the possibility of partiality in-
creased the danger of suggestive influences. The modifications in the witness' story after
hypnosis should have alerted the court to the potential for confabulation, or memory altera-
tion or distortion. Finally, the court should have requested more testimony before accepting
the validity of the hypnotic procedure used. Id.
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mine with greater certainty whether suggestiveness rendered the re-
freshed memory inaccurate. Since the hypnotist may not have been
aware of a particular suggestive influence, the court should not rely
upon the hypnotist's assessment of the veracity of the hypno-induced
memory.
Recent decisions demonstrate growing judicial cognizance of the
danger that suggestiveness in the hypnotic procedure may result in inac-
curate recall. 61 In State v. Mack," the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the trial court should exclude the testimony of a victim whose
memory had been refreshed by pretrial hypnosis. 3 After hearing five ex-
pert witnesses on the nature and uses of hypnosis, the Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that hypnosis failed to satisfy the Frye re-
quirement for admissibility."4 In addition, the court held that the
evidence lacked sufficient reliability for the probative value to outweigh
the prejudicial effects of the testimony.,' Although the admissibility rul-
ing focused upon the general reliability of hypno-induced testimony, the
court found the particular facts of the case supportive of the holding.6
The court noted that suggestiveness in the hypnotic interview may have
created an inaccurate recollection of the events surrounding the alleged
crime. 7 The court presumed that the hypnotist's lack of experience and
knowledge of hypnotic techinques affected his ability to eliminate sug-
gestive influences from the session. 6 The presence of the police during
the session alerted the court to the danger that the police may have sug-
gested an opinion or theory concerning the actual events. In addition,
the absence of any corroboration of the asserted facts contributed to the
court's assessment that the victim's testimony was unreliable. 9
The Mack court further found that, in the case at hand, the use of
hypnosis was unnecessary to assist the victim in identifying the defend-
ant.6 The accused was the only person present in the hotel room with
, See note 11 supra.
2- Minn. -, 292 N.W.2d 764 (1980).
Prior to the determination of probable cause, the trial court certified to the Min-
nesota Supreme Court the question concerning the use of hypno-induced testimony in a
criminal trial. Id at -, 292 N.W.2d at 765. The victim underwent hypnosis to restore her
memory of the events surrounding an alleged assault. The victim could not remember what
happened, because she was intoxicated at the time of the alleged attack. Id- at -, 292
N.W.2d at 767.
SId. at - , 292 N.W.2d at 768; see text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
'- Minn. at - , 292 N.W.2d at 771.
Id at .292 N.W.2d at 772.
e Id at -, 292 N.W.2d at 769-71.
' Id. at -, 292 N.W.2d at 772; see text accompanying note 49 supra. The hypnotist
was a self-taught law hypnotist. Because the police hired the hypnotist, the court noted a
possible lack of impartiality and presumed the presence of suggestive influences. - Minn.
at -, 292 N.W.2d at 772.
69 Id
70 Id. The Mack court looked for corroboration of facts which the witness recalled for
the first time under hypnosis and which previously were unknown to the police. The court
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the victim when the injury occurred.71 The victim underwent hypnosis in
an attempt to remember whether the accused was responsible for the in-
jury.72 In stating that hypno-induced testimony is ordinarily inadmissi-
ble, the Mack court indicated that such testimony might be admissible
under certain circumstances." The court implied that the admission
hypno-induced testimony for identification purposes might be accept-
able. In addition, if a hypnotist guarded against suggestive influences
and independent evidence substantiated the hypno-induced testimony,
the court might consider the testimony adequately reliable to warrant
admission even though hypnosis fails the Frye test of general accept-
ance.
The Mack court's implied approval of the use of hypnosis to assist in
identification reflects that hypnotically-refreshed testimony is intro-
duced primarily for identification purposes.74 Judicial concern for protec-
tion against suggestiveness in the hypnotic session increases significantly
in cases involving identification of a criminal defendant. In Neil v. Big-
gers,75 the Supreme Court mandated the exclusion of an in-court iden-
tification of the accused if an unduly suggestive pretrial procedure
renders the identification unreliable. 76 The Court's ruling focused upon
the hazards of unfairness to the accused due to the suggestiveness in-
herent in the context of the pretrial identification. 77 Because hypnosis
substantially increases the potential for suggestibility in a pretrial iden-
tification procedure, courts must investigate closely the problem of sug-
gestiveness in the hypnotic session to satisfy the Biggers requirements.
In People v. Smrekar,78 the Illinois Appellate Court employed the
Biggers analysis in determining the admissibility of the testimony of a
noted that some of the "remembered" details were factually incorrect. The victim described
the accused's motorcycle incorrectly and stated that she had eaten pizza for lunch at a




"' See e.g., United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 280 (E.D. Mich. 1977); State v.
LaMountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 550-51, 611 P.2d 551 (1980); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App.3d
379, 388, 385 N.E.2d 848, 855 (1979); State v. Hurd, 172 N.J. Super. 333, 361-62, 414 A.2d 291,
305-06 (1980); State v. White, No. J-3665 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee Cty. 1979).
"1 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
71 Although Neil v. Biggers does not involve an hypnotic pretrial identification, the
Supreme Court's primary concern is suggestiveness in any pretrial identification. In Neil v.
Biggers, the Supreme Court held that suggestiveness alone does not require the exclusion
of an in-court identification. Id at 199. The Court applied the test whether the identification
was reliable under the totality of the circumstances, even though the confrontation pro-
cedure was suggestive. Id Determinative factors included the opportunity of the witness to
view the criminal at the scene of the crime, the accuracy of the witness' prior description,
the witness' degree of certainty at the pre-trial identification, and the length of time be-
tween the crime and the confrontation. Id
7 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 234-35 (1967).
78 68 Ill. App.3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979).
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prosecution witness who underwent hypnosis in an effort to identify the
person she saw at the scene of the crime.79 In ruling the witness' testi-
mony admissible, the court found that the pretrial hypnosis did not
render the testimony unreliable."s The hypnotist's established com-
petence in the use and knowledge of hypnosis influenced the court's deci-
sion."' In the absence of a record of the hypnotic interview, the court
relied upon the hypnotist's denial of the presence of any suggestiveness
in the pretrial identification." The court found no evidence demon-
strating that the hypnotist made any reference to the defendant during
the session. 3 Independent evidence, unknown to the witness at the time
of the pretrial identification, substantially corroborated the identifica-
tion.84 Furthermore, the witness had adequate opportunity to view the
person at the scene of the crime. 5 These four factors convinced the court
that suggestiveness did not taint the pretrial identification and that the
identification had an independent origin. Thus, the court found the
witness' testimony sufficiently reliable to be of probative value to the
jury.
86
Despite the Smrekar court's inquiry into the possibility of sugges-
tiveness in the hypnotic session, the dissent severely criticized the ma-
jority for failing to require greater scrutiny of the hypnotic procedure
before granting admission. 7 The dissent argued that a court should re-
quire the establishment of both the reliability of hypnosis generally to
restore accurate memory and the reliability of the hypnotic procedure
followed in the particular case.8 The dissent stated that a recording of
Id at 386, 385 N.E.2d at 853.
Id at 387, 385 N.E.2d at 855. Although the Smrekar court cites to Stovall v. Denno,
its progeny include Neil v. Biggers because in both cases the Supreme Court applies the
same test for validity of pretrial identifications. Compare Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
301-02 (1966) (whether pretrial identification excluded because so unnecessarily suggestive
depends on totality of circumstances) with note 76 supra (discussion of Biggers analysis).
Evidence of impairment of the witness' ability to recall events accurately or that suggestive
influences were involved in the witness' recollection bears only upon the weight accorded
the testimony. 68 Ill. App.3d at 386, 385 N.E.2d at 853.
11 Id at 388, 385 N.E.2d at 855. The hypnotist was a doctor who had been using hyp-
nosis regularly for 10 to 15 years. The expert witness offered no showing of certification as
a specialist in hypnosis. Id. at 387, 385 N.E.2d at 854.
8 Id at 388, 385 N.E.2d at 855. The Smrekar court noted that reliance upon the hyp-
notist's version of the conversation during hypnosis was not the best means of detecting
suggestiveness. The court mentioned that certification of the hypnotist and a record of the
persons present and of the hypnotic interview would provide greater safeguards against
suggestion. Id. at 387, 385 N.E.2d at 854.
83 Id
Id at 388, 385 N.E.2d at 855.
Id. After hearing a gun blast, the witness observed for 30 to 40 seconds a man slowly
walking in the victims' yard. Id at 382, 385 N.E.2d at 851. The witness lived next door to
the victims and watched the man through her window. Id The incident occurred around one
a.m. Id
. Id at 388, 385 N.E.2d at 855.




the hypnotic interview would be essential to determine whether sugges-
tion had tainted the identification. 9 The dissent asserted that testimony
obtained by hypnosis should be inadmissible if a court has no evidence
for determining the reliability of the procedure used in the particular
case.
90
The New Jersey Superior Court in State v. Hurd" emphasized the
importance of investigating the reliability of the hypnotic technique as a
prerequisite to admission of hypno-induced testimony.92 The court's ma-
jor concern was that the victim's hypno-induced testimony was a product
of suggestion in the pretrial identification. The court thoroughly ex-
amined the general reliability of hypnosis as a memory refresher and the
specific reliability of the procedure used in the case. 4 As in Smrekar, the
standard for admissibility was whether the identification procedure was
so impermissibly suggestive as to indicate substantial likelihood of
misidentification. 5 The expert witnesses for the defense and prosecution
expressed contrary opinions on the reliability of the evidence. The
Hurd court relied upon the testimony of a defense witness in concluding
that the dangers of heightened suggestibility and fantasizing during
hypnosis did not permit admission of hypno-induced testimony absent
the establishment of an acceptable level of reliability of the refreshed
recall.97
The Hurd court adopted an extensive set of procedural safeguards
as a condition precedent for admitting hypno-induced recollections.98
" Id
90 Id-
173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291 (1980).
Id. at 362-63, 414 A.2d at 305-06.
'3 Id. at 360, 414 A.2d at 304. The victim in Hurd was unwilling or unable to identify
the attacker prior to the hypnotic session. Id.
" Id at 360-63, 414 A.2d at 304-06.
Id.
The Hurd court heard the testimony of five experts in the field of hypnosis. The
hypnotist who induced the hypnosis asserted that the procedure was completely free of sug-
gestion, coercion, or taint and that the victim's recollections were authentic. Id. at 343, 414
A.2d at 296. The hypnotist insisted that the subject had the opportunity to remember or not
remember and the option to determine what she could remember. Id A defense witness
concluded that the questions and conduct of the police during the interview coerced the vic-
tim into making the identification of the defendant. Id at 347, 414 A.2d at 298. The experts
disagreed upon the witness' susceptibility to hypnosis and potential for suggestibility. IM. at
343, 414 A.2d at 296. The hypnotist placed the witness on the mid-range of his scale of
susceptibility. Id. at 340, 414 A.2d at 294. The defense expert attacked this assessment and
stated that the victim appeared to be highly susceptible to hypnosis. Id. at 343, 414 A.2d at
295. The dispute was significant to the hypnotist's conclusion regarding the absence of sug-
gestivity in the hypnotic session. Id. at 343, 414 A.2d at 296. If the subject were highly sug-
gestible, suggestive influences would be more likely to have an influence upon the accuracy
of her recall. Both experts agreed that independent verification of the subject's statements
was essential to determining reliability. Id at 349, 414 A.2d at 299.
Id. at 363, 414 A.2d at 305.
9s Id. at 363, 414 A.2d at 306. In State v. White, in response to the recommendations of
the same expert witness as in Hurd, the Milwaukee County Court adopted a list of
1981]
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First, the hypnotist should be a licensed psychiatrist or psyhologist
trained in the use of hypnosis.9 In addition, the court emphasized the im-
portance of the hypnotist's independence from the parties involved in
the case.' 0 Third, prior to the hypnotic session, law enforcement person-
nel must make a record of all information given the hypnotist,' and the
hypnotist should obtain from the subject a detailed account of the
remembered facts." 2 As an additional safeguard, the court required a
recording of the hypnotic interview.'' The court further stated that only
the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any phase of the
entire hypnotic process.'
Applying these safeguards to the facts of Hurd, the New Jersey
Superior Court held that the absence of substantial compliance with
these safeguards indicated the probability that suggestiveness rendered
the memory inaccurate and warranted exclusion of the testimony.' The
hypnotist satisfied the court's requirements for expertise and in-
dependence from the prosecutor's office.' In the absence of a record of
the information given the hypnotist, a detailed statement of the
subject's pre-hypnosis recollection, and a recording of the interview, the
Hurd court was unwilling to assert that the hypnotic session was not un-
duly suggestive. 7 Moreover, the presence of law enforcement officials
during the hypnotic interviews gave rise to an inference that the of-
ficials communicated an opinion to the subject/witness regarding the
identification sought."' Because the available information did not in-
dicate the effect of any possible suggestiveness on the victim's memory,
safeguards almost identical to those enunciated in Hurd. Compare State v. White, No.
J-3665 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee Cty. 1979) with text accompanying notes 99-104 infra. The
Milwaukee County Court added the further requirement that the hypnotist should not
receive verbal information about the case but should be informed in writing. No. J-3665 at
11. In addition, the subject should undergo a psychological test to determine the subject's
ability to comprehend the meaning of the hypnotic session. Id. The court advised the hyp-
notist to be careful not to add any new elements to the subject's description of the events.
Id. at 12. Finally, the court considered the importance of corroborating evidence. Id.
Id. at 363, 414 A.2d at 306.
too Id.
"Id. The maintenance of a record of information given the hypnotist provides the
court with further evidence regarding what the hypnotist could have suggested to the sub-
ject.
1. Id The trial court can compare the memory of the witness prior to hypnosis with
the witness' restored memory following hypnosis to detect changes in the recollection.
... Id. A recording assisted the court in locating suggestiveness.
I" Id. The safeguard limiting the persons present at the session protects against the
presence of suggestive influences. The hypnotic session includes the pre-hypnotic testing
and post-hypnotic interview.
1O5 Id.
" The hypnotist in Hurd was a psychiatrist and acknowledged authority on hypnosis.
Id. Although the prosecutor initiated the retainer of the services of the hypnotist, the hyp-




1981] SAFEGUARDS AGAINST SUGGESTIVENESS 211
the court refused to uphold the admission of potentially unreliable testi-
mony.
10 9
The procedural safeguards delineated by the Hurd court provide an
effective means of balancing the probative value of the witness' hypno-
induced testimony against the danger that the jury will place undue
significance on the testimony. The possibility that suggestiveness in the
hypnotic session will impair the accuracy of the restored memory and of
the subsequent testimony militates against automatic admissibility of
hypno-induced testimony. Courts should investigate the entire hypnotic
procedure to determine whether the testimony is reliable before allow-
ing a jury to consider the evidence.110 The potential for hypnosis to
restore an historically accurate memory, however, weighs against auto-
matic exclusion on the grounds of unreliability.1 Thus, courts should be
reluctant to exclude hypno-induced testimony of a victim or other
witness merely because hypnosis was used as a memory refresher.1
The safeguards enunciated in Hurd establish an adequate procedural
guide for determining the effect of suggestiveness upon reliability. In
emphasizing the importance of suggestiveness, the court has responded
to the medical profession's acknowledgement of the effects of suggestion
during hypnosis upon the memory.' Courts should require an extensive
examination of the hypnotic procedure in order to detect suggestiveness
in all cases involving hypnosis as a memory refresher., The Hurd safe-
guards not only permit the detection of suggestiveness but also protect
against the introduction of suggestive influences which may taint the
pretrial identification. Thus, the establishment of extensive guidelines
can minimize objections to admissibility on the grounds of unreli-
ability.115 The requirement of a recording of the hypnotic session
eliminates the court's need to rely upon the testimony and cross-
examination of the hypnotist to locate the presence of suggestive in-
I10 Id.
Il0 The trial court should make the determination of admissibility of the testimony in a
hearing out of the presence of the jury. Id. at 364, 414 A.2d at 307.
" See text accompanying note 5 supra.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting
predicate that in-court testimony of subject who previously had been hypnotized is
unreliable as matter of law); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427 (1978)
(witness' pre-trial hypnosis affected credibility rather than admissibility); State v.
Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 9, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971) (use of hypnosis prior to testifying not
basis for disallowing testimony).
11 See text accompanying notes 15-25 supra.
.. The most thorough investigations of suggestiveness have come from those courts
which responded to the constitutional requirement for protection against suggestiveness in
pretrial identifications. See People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App.3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979);
State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291 (1980); State v. White, No. J-3665 (Cir. Ct.
Milwaukee Cty. 1979); text accompanying notes 78-109 supra.
... See generally Safeguards, supra note 50, at 117. The presence of safeguards against
abuse enhances admissibility of testimony from a hypnotically-restored recollection.
Refreshing Memory of Witness, supra note 40, at 268.
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fluences. In addition, by taking a statement of the witness' recollection
prior to hypnosis, the court can compare the consistency of the pre- and
post-hypnotic statements. Inconsistency should alert the court to the
danger of unreliability. Thus, the combination of procedural safeguards,
independent corroboration, and precautionary instruction"' can provide
a basis for justifying the admission of hypno-induced testimony.
JULIA G. THIGPEN
11 Courts should emphasize to the jury that the validity of hypnotic recall should be
equated with that of normal recall. See Haward & Ashworth, supra note 36, at 474.
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